Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
28th Annual Intellectual Property Law & Policy
Conference (2021)

Fordham Intellectual Property Law Institute

4-8-2021 11:45 AM

3C Copyright Law Session. U.S. Copyright Developments
David O. Carson
Ralph Oman
Nick Bartelt
Steven Tepp
Kevin Madigan

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ipli_conf_28th_2021
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Authors
David O. Carson, Ralph Oman, Nick Bartelt, Steven Tepp, Kevin Madigan, Robert J. Bernstein, and
Jonathan Band

Session 3C

Emily C. & John E. Hansen Intellectual Property Institute
TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW & POLICY
Thursday, April 8, 2021 – 11:45 a.m.

SESSION 3: COPYRIGHT LAW
3C. U.S. Copyright Developments
Moderator:
David O. Carson
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria
Speakers:
Ralph Oman
The George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C.
State Immunity from Monetary Damages for Copyright Infringement: Is the
14th Amendment Poised to Outflank the 11th Amendment Defense?
Nick Bartelt
U.S. Copyright Office, Washington, D.C.
A Fair Use Update: Embedding, Tattoos, Experimenting, and Seuss
Steven Tepp
Sentinel Worldwide, Washington, D.C.
Google v. Oracle: Cheat Code vs. Declaring Code
Kevin Madigan
Copyright Alliance, Washington, D.C.
Copyright Small Claims and Closing the Streaming Loophole: An Overview
of the PLSA and CASE Act
Panelists:
Robert J. Bernstein
Law Office of Robert J. Bernstein, New York
Jonathan Band
Jonathan Band PLLC, Washington, D.C.
* * *

1

Session 3C
RALPH OMAN: I'm talking about Allen v. Cooper,1 the state sovereign
immunity case. Last year the Supreme Court held in that case that the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act 2 (CRCA), which we enacted in 1990, failed to
abrogate some of the Eleventh Amendment3 prohibition on suits for monetary
damages against states. The Court looked at the legislative record on which
Congress relied and found that Congress did not have enough evidence –
evidence of widespread, willful, or recurring state infringement to justify the
abrogation of state immunity for all copyright cases across the board.
The Court said that that remedy which had been adopted by the CRCA
is not, in its words, “congruent and proportional” 4 to the nature of the wrong.
Many commentators, including some famous treatise writers in fact, criticized
the holding, saying it reflected a lack of respect for the predictive judgment of
Congress. They had held hearings, they had talked to the experts, they had
touched all the bases, but that was insufficient to satisfy the Supreme Court.
Even so, the authors are now stuck with the holding. The Eleventh
Amendment trumps the CRCA. The Constitution prevails over the statute. You
may remember that Mr. Allen is a videographer who shot incredible underwater
footage of the salvaging of the sunken flagship of Blackbeard the Pirate, named
(for copyright purposes) appropriately, Queen Anne's Revenge, which
Blackbeard had seized from the French. Mr. Allen risked his life and a part of
his fortune, in creating these videos in the stormy and murky waters of the
Atlantic off the coast of North Carolina.
Almost immediately after he shot those videos, state officials infringed
Mr. Allen's work willfully, repeatedly, and physically by posting all of them on
the North Carolina website. The North Carolina Legislature even passed a law
effectively confiscating Mr. Allen's copyright in the videos, which they called
“Blackbeard's Law.” 5 Talk about willful infringement, that is an excellent
example. Mr. Allen sued the Governor of North Carolina under the CRCA. The
district court found that the Eleventh Amendment barred money damages and
dismissed the suit. 6 The Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision. 7 Then, as we
know, Supreme Court affirmed 9-0. The case is now back in the Eastern District
of North Carolina on a motion to reconsider.
The briefs cite two major changes in the law as justification for
reconsideration by the court. The first one is a recent Supreme Court decision,
Knick v. Township of Scott,8 in which the Supreme Court held that the federal
taking claim under the Constitution can go directly to federal court without
exhausting state remedies—very important. Second, the new legal theory
focused on the Court's decision in Allen v. Cooper, which, as I said earlier,
limited the reach of the CRCA on which Mr. Allen had relied in his original
lawsuit. This time, Mr. Allen is not relying on the CRCA. Instead, he's relying
on the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which is subsequent to and
1

Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749, 17 U.S.C.
§ 511(a), invalidated by Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4
Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004.
5
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (b).
6
Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 545 (E.D.N.C. 2017), rev'd and remanded, 895
F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018), aff'd, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
7
Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir. 2018), aff'd, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
8
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
2

2

Session 3C
presumably prevails over the Eleventh Amendment. The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the taking of property without due process of law. Also,
as Mr. Allen argues, it prohibits the taking of property without just
compensation.
The district court decision is due soon and it will have a bearing on
possible renewed efforts in Congress to resolve the issue legislatively. Congress
has already asked the Copyright Office to revisit the issue and write a report
based on new marketplace realities, and on its evaluation of the magnitude of
the problem of state copyright infringement in the digital age. That's the
question. Will this new approach succeed, and will it let authors pierce the
Eleventh Amendment to sue and collect money damages from a state that
infringes? I expect that the Copyright Office study will have many more
examples of willful infringement by the states than the two examples that we
came up with in 1988. In 1988, the states all assumed that they were liable for
monetary damages, and they acted accordingly. That changed with the various
Supreme Court Eleventh Amendment cases. Since the states thought they were
liable for monetary damages, they took copyright very seriously. When they
thought they were no longer liable, they took it less seriously. Training
programs suffered. They relied less frequently on the copyright experts in their
bureaucracies. They relied less on expert advice from law firms. The big change
is the digital technology, which makes copying fast, easy, and cheap. Back in
1988, many of the states never responded to our questionnaires. With the higher
profile of copyright today, I predict that most of them will respond to inquiries
from the Copyright Office, or else we'll send the new Register of Copyrights
after them. Shira Perlmutter can be very persuasive.
Also, the only two cases of willful infringement the court pointed to
from the 1988 report will be seen for what they were – the tip of the iceberg.
Even back then, it was an inaccurate reflection of reality. In fact, most copyright
cases, especially those involving state universities, turned out to be settled rather
than pursued in litigation. The study of the case law would not reveal those
examples. That's the basis of it. I gave you a status report and I suspect that
maybe next year me or someone else will give you the final word. Thank you
very much, David.
DAVID CARSON: My apologies for my late arrival; I had some
technical difficulties. Let me just step back for a minute and give you the
overview and then we'll get into a couple of questions for Ralph. As you know,
Ralph has already addressed the first issue, but it's one of about four issues we're
going to be talking about, depending on how you want to carve them up. The
overview is that it's been a pretty momentous year in copyright. We've had more
legislative activity than usual and there have been significant developments in
the courts, as we all well know and as we're all about to hear.
On Monday, we got a decision in what was billed as the copyright case
of the century. Later on in this panel, maybe we'll answer the question whether
it lived up to its billing. We've already talked about the aftermath of Allen v.
Cooper, and we're going to have a little bit of discussion on that in a moment.
Then we're going to talk about some developments in fair use case law, which
will be a little teaser before we hear about what the Supreme Court did in its
recent fair use decision in Google v. Oracle.9
9

Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
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We're then going to hear about two significant copyright statutes enacted
by Congress at the end of the year, addressing issues that have been on
Congress's agenda for many years, but that we were never sure Congress would
actually deal with. All in all, quite a lot to talk about. We got a great group of
experts here to do it. I'm going to introduce each of them now because I
encourage all of them to participate in all of our discussions that are going to
follow each of the speaker's presentations. Ralph, who as you know just talked
about state sovereign immunity, will be followed by Nick Bartelt, who's going
to guide us through some of the recent case law on fair use. As many of you
know, in his former life, Nick was a key member of the group that puts the
Fordham Conference together. His presentation should be a good lead-in for
Steven Tepp of Sentinel Worldwide, who will talk about the Google v. Oracle
decision that came down three days ago. Insiders think the reason the Court
issued the opinion on Monday was to make Steve start all over in his
presentation for today's panel. I suspect that in 25 minutes when he's scheduled
to start speaking, Steve will have just about finished putting his notes together.
Finally, Kevin Madigan of the Copyright Alliance is going to talk about
two legislative developments at the end of last year: the Protecting Lawful
Streaming Act 10 (PLSA) and the Copyright Alternative in Small Claims
(CASE) Act. The Copyright Alliance was actively involved in both bills. Maybe
we'll get the inside story on that. We also have two panelists who are going to
bring some interesting, and I think diverse perspectives to share on these topics.
We have Bob Bernstein, who practices copyright law in New York, and
Jonathan Band, who practices copyright law in Washington, D.C.
With that belated introduction, let's pose at least a couple questions to
Ralph and the panel at large on the sovereign-immunity issue. Ralph, in Allen
v. Cooper, the Court invited or maybe dared Congress to try again to abrogate
state sovereign immunity if it could create a legislative record that justified
abrogation. Back in 1990, when Congress enacted the Copyright Remedies
Clarification Act (CRCA), it was based on your report, but in Allen, the Court
concluded that your findings didn't present a sufficient factual record of state
infringement.
That wasn't your fault, because the Court changed the rules on us all
back in the late nineties in the Florida Prepaid11 case. The Court observed a
couple days ago that your report came up with only a dozen possible examples
of state infringement, and that in your testimony before Congress you
acknowledged state infringement isn't widespread, and that states are not going
to get involved in a wholesale violation of copyright laws.
I'm not sure that's what I heard you say predictively just now in your
presentation, but just with that in mind, what quantity of infringement by states
do you think Congress is going to have to find in order to satisfy the Court that
it has an adequate record to abrogate state sovereign immunity without getting
slapped down by the Court again?
RALPH OMAN: I mentioned in my presentation that the world has
changed since 1988 when we conducted the state survey. The Copyright Office
still doesn't have subpoena power, but it will have tools that can be used
effectively to get correct information. I would urge the private sector to take
10
11

Protecting Lawful Streaming Act of 2020, 18 U.S.C. § 2319C.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627

(1999).
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this—especially the Copyright Office study—very seriously to show how a lot
of the infringing activity committed by the states never gets reported in official
legal volumes. The cases are settled.
The states obviously don't want it widely reported that they're copyright
scofflaws. They will do their best to conceal it by settling or by other nefarious
efforts. In any case, the fact that Congress will be relying heavily on the
Copyright Office report will determine what route they take. If there is evidence
of egregious widespread copying, Congress may create a broader bill. If it's
limited to the willful infringement because the Copyright Office report indicates
that the examples of state infringement are few and far between, that too is a
possibility. I suspect that the Copyright Office is going to come up with a lot of
juicy, red meat that is going to be of great interest to Congress.
DAVID CARSON: Kevin, I don't mean to put you on the spot, but I
guess I'm going to. You're at the Copyright Alliance, which I know submitted
comments to the Copyright Office in the ongoing study. I assume you made the
best case you could that there have been a large number of willful infringements.
Can you tell us a little bit about the kind of case that was made and whether you
think it was adequate?
KEVIN MADIGAN: Yes, sure. We launched this survey back last
summer to help the Copyright Office out in their study where we basically
solicited feedback from copyright owners on their experience with infringement
by states. We also conducted a number of interviews with a number of
individual creators and organizations. The result of our research is that we
compiled compelling evidence exploring that remedies against state
infringement are inadequate and really non-existent in some states, and state
copyright infringement occurs frequently and is harmful to copyright owners.
I think the key takeaway from our survey might have been the responses
to the question of when people had experienced infringement. We had some
people reporting infringement by states as far back as 1978. What we really
found was a pronounced trend of increased infringement starting in the mid-tolate 1990s, as you might expect with the cases, and then increasing yearly to the
2000s and 2010s with the most occurring in 2019.
We think that the consistent rise over the last 20 years corresponds with
the cases, the late '90s cases like Florida Prepaid that challenged the validity of
the CRCA. We're hoping that the Copyright Office will take our survey into
account when they come up with their study.
DAVID CARSON: Since Florida Prepaid, I think most people have
probably assumed that when the case reached the Court, it would end up saying
what it did end up saying, which is that they're going to treat copyright the same
way they treat patents and trademarks, and a sufficient record hadn't been made
by Congress when it tried to abrogate sovereign immunity. One would assume
that more often than not that ever since Florida Prepaid, when someone thought
they had a claim of copyright infringement against the state, they probably
wouldn't even have bothered to file a suit, because what's the point? The
outcome was probably pretty apparent.
I would think that when the Copyright Office looked at the record,
they're going to have to go beyond the actual filed cases, because as I said,
they're probably only going to be the tip of the iceberg in terms of the actual
incidents. Do you have any sense of how easy it has been to come up with cases
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of examples of infringement that weren't litigated just because it was futile to
do so?
KEVIN MADIGAN: Yes, we tried to do a little bit of that in our survey
by interviewing a number of creators who both had and had not filed lawsuits.
What was found was that one of the questions in our survey when people would
respond that they hadn't filed lawsuit, we asked why. We found a majority of
the respondents said exactly that, that they felt that because of state sovereign
immunity, it was a waste of their time and resources and that nothing would
come of it. We included those results in our survey. It's tough to show
sometimes when you don't have that record of filed cases. Again, we hope that
the things that we compiled are helpful to the Copyright Office.
JONATHAN BAND: Just a couple of very quick points. First, the issue
of sovereign immunity basically says that the states aren't liable for damages,
but they can still be liable for injunctive relief. If there were so many cases of
egregious willful infringement, you would see those cases. But the point is you
haven't because there aren't those cases. Ralph says, there's all these scofflaws
who then settle. Well, wait a minute, why would a state settle if it was a
scofflaw?
The point is that states do settle routinely when it turns out that they have
infringed rights, not because they have to but because they want to. Because
they feel that they want to be good players in the ecosystem. In the vast majority
of situations where there is something that appears to be a legitimate instance
of infringement, the states are happy to settle because they think that that's the
right thing to do.
Just to close the point, I think the record that the Copyright Alliance was
able to put together—I'm sure they worked as hard as they could—but it was a
very thin record, considering that it was asking for the past 20 years, all 50
states, and they were able to come up with a relatively small number of cases.
Then the roundtables that the Copyright Office held also did not produce a lot
of examples. I think the Copyright Office is really going to have a problem
making the record that would meet the Supreme Court's standards.
DAVID CARSON: Ralph mentioned the Allen case, it's back on remand
now. I hadn't realized this until Ralph mentioned it, but they're now pursuing a
takings claim. I think it's also the case – and if anyone has any more information
on this, I hope they'll share it with us – that at least in a number of states, it's at
least theoretically possible to file a claim through the state's own processes,
whether through their courts or through administrative proceedings, under the
rubric of a taking without compensation, without due process. Has that been
tried? Is anyone aware of what kind of record has been presented in the ongoing
study right now?
JONATHAN BAND: Well, I know that in the Copyright Office
roundtables there was someone from the University of Texas who was talking
about Texas’ procedure where they have an administrative procedure for exactly
as you described. As you mentioned, many other states have that as well. The
rights holders pursue those remedies in those tribunals and it works.
DAVID CARSON: Ralph or anyone else, do you have a reaction to the
availability of that remedy to the extent that that is a remedy that actually is
available? Does that really answer the question?
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RALPH OMAN: I'm not aware of any specific cases that dealt with
money damages under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Knick12 case they did
allow money damages under the Fifth Amendment constitutional violation.
DAVID CARSON: Well, maybe one final question. I’m not quite sure
how much time we have. Steve?
STEVEN TEPP: Jonathan's right. It's going to be very difficult to meet
the standard the Supreme Court set because the standard the Supreme Court set
is so high. It's worth noting that over the 20 or 30 years that this type of case
law has been evolving, the Supreme Court has been ratcheting up higher and
higher what that standard is. Congress complied with the standard, but that got
struck down. They complied with the standard again, they got struck down
again.
One can question whether there's justice being done here. The notion of
going through state law claims or takings claims, these are workarounds to try
and find a way to get justice. Do I think every state is rampantly violating
copyrights willfully all the time? Probably not. Are there definitely anecdotes
where states have violated copyrights and they come into settlement
negotiations with an absolutely intransigent attitude saying, "You can't sue us
so there's not much you can do?" We heard that at the Copyright Office
roundtable. One participant said, "Hey, you took your shot at the Supreme
Court, you lost, so you got to live with it." The truth is somewhere in the middle,
the reality is that the Supreme Court's standard for how much evidence is
necessary, and Ralph alluded to this in his opening remarks, is a sliding scale.
The broader the prophylactic nature of the legislation to preemptively waive
state sovereign immunity, the more evidence you need.
If there is in fact less evidence than the Supreme Court seems to be
demanding, then Congress could still enact a narrower statute successfully to
provide copyright owners with at least some way to move forward without
disrupting the unified system of federal court jurisprudence over copyright and
pushing this off in the state courts where you're going to resume having all sorts
of disparate decisions across the country.
DAVID CARSON: Our time on this is up, but maybe we can pursue that
in a general discussion that follows. Now, let's move on because Nick is now
going to give us his overview of the pre-Google v. Oracle fair use case law from
the past year or so. Nick?
NICK BARTELT: Thanks, David. I appreciate all the input that we've
received into the Copyright Office’s ongoing study of sovereign immunity, and
we'll make what we can of it. I think initially we had planned for it to be released
in April, but now it’s planned for a few months later, maybe later this summer.
I don't have the exact dates but stay tuned. It's on our website.
DAVID CARSON: It’s the end of August, Nick.
NICK BARTELT: The end of August. That's right. I thought it had been
pushed. It is a busy time at the Copyright Office. I think Shira let everybody
know that this morning. Anyway, fair use, another area that we’re covering. I
think this presentation pulls largely from the Copyright Office’s Fair Use Index.
Since 2019, there have been about 75 copyright cases that have
addressed fair use. I hope people are familiar with some of these, so the visual
aids won't make that much of a difference. The first topic I really want to hit on
12
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were these embedding cases. First, what's embedding? Embedding of websites,
of posts. It's usually where a website includes code that will retrieve a post—
text, image, video, tweet—from another website and displays that content.
In 2020 alone, there were at least three cases that involved an embedded
Instagram image where fair use was considered. The first one is McGucken v.
Newsweek,13 where a professional photographer published an image he took of
an ephemeral lake that appeared in Death Valley.
Newsweek embedded the post in an article about the lake that it
published online. The article credited the photographer and incorporated quotes
from his social media post. A motion to dismiss on fair use grounds was denied
in this case because the post was used as an illustrative aid for the subject of the
article, that is, the ephemeral lake. Token commentary about the post was not
enough to transform the image and imbue it with a new meaning. No evidence
was presented to overcome a presumption of market harm.
A second case, Walsh v. Townsquare Media.14 Like in McGucken, here
we had another case of embedded Instagram posts. But unlike in McGucken,
here the court found fair use largely because the embedded post and the
comments on the post were the focus of the article. The online magazine did not
use the photograph as a generic image of Cardi B—here you would see that
image of Cardi B to accompany an article about Cardi B—but rather published
the post, which incidentally contained this photograph because the post is the
very thing the article was reporting on. On the fourth factor, in this case, the
court found it implausible that the embedded post would harm the licensing
market for the standalone photo.
A third case, Boesen v. United Sports Publications,15 is similar to Walsh
in that this is another case where an Instagram post was embedded in an article
that commented on the content of the post itself, with the post being about
Caroline Wozniacki announcing her retirement from tennis on Instagram, using
a picture of her younger self, which you can see.
Again, the court found this to be fair use because it was not being used
simply as a generic image of Wozniacki, but rather to illustrate an article about
her commenting on the post itself. There are a couple of follow-up decisions in
this case, including one where attorneys’ fees were denied. The judge reasoned
partly that this was a relatively novel factual context and that three district court
decisions do not create a consensus, so we'll see how that develops over time.
Turning to a second area, there are a few cases about tattoos being
reproduced in other media. Solid Oak Sketches v. 2K Games16 involves claims
involving certain tattoo designs that appear on the bodies of NBA players and
that were reproduced in a video game that simulates NBA basketball. On
summary judgment, the court found in favor of the video game makers on fair
use and other defenses including that the use was de minimis and that the players
had an implied license to use the tattoos as part of their likenesses.
Why was this a fair use? Clearly, the tattoo designs are expressive, not
factual works, though the court downplayed their creativity as being based on
common motifs or photographs. More significantly, the court saw that the
13

McGucken v. Newsweek LLC, 464 F. Supp. 3d 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Walsh v. Townsquare Media, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 3d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
15
Boesen v. United Sports Publications, Ltd., No. 20CV1552ARRSIL, 2020 WL
6393010 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2020).
16
Solid Oak Sketches, LLC v. 2K Games, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
14
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tattoos were not being used for their particular creativity but rather for a factual
transformative purpose for the “general recognizability” of the players.
In light of that purpose, the court focused on the tattoos’ reduced size,
they're pretty small in the game, and that they constituted an inconsequential
portion of the overall game, observing that the tattoos appeared on 3 out of 400
players and were a small fraction of overall game data. On market harm, the
players had conceded the use of the tattoos in the game were not a substitute for
the use in any other medium.
There is a second case that's ongoing involving WWE wrestlers,17 which
also on summary judgment considered the same defenses. But the court, in the
Southern District of Illinois, actually has dismissed the de minimis use argument
and found that there are unresolved material factual disputes concerning the fair
use defense and the implied license defense. So, we'll see what happens as that
case proceeds to trial.
A third development, experimenting, comes from the case Chapman v.
Maraj. 18 This was a dispute where the defendant ultimately settled, but
significant because of the partial success of a novel fair use defense. The court
found it can be fair use to use the lyrics and vocal melodies of a musical work
for artistic experimentation and for the purpose of securing a license. Nicki
Minaj covered a remake of a song by Tracy Chapman. The remake was not
commercially released, but it was leaked on the radio resulting in Chapman
suing Minaj for distributing a derivative work.
The court here found it compelling that musicians experiment with
derivative versions of songs all the time, often with the intention of seeking a
license before release, which a songwriter may even require hearing before
granting permission. The court was concerned that “uprooting . . . [these]
common practices would limit creativity and stifle innovation within the music
industry.” That said, Minaj's fair-use defense was only successful as to her
creation of that work, and the unauthorized distribution claims survived. The
parties ultimately settled this in December; and a judgment of $450K was
entered in favor of Chapman in January.
Finally, there were three circuit courts of appeal decisions over the last
few years. The Fourth, Ninth, and Second Circuits have reversed findings of
fair use by the district courts in their respective jurisdictions. The first one is
Brammer v. Violent Hues.19 This is an example of where the district court pretty
clearly went astray and the appellate court corrected the analysis, concluding it
was not a fair use. Here, the film festival organizer had used a cropped version
of the photo on the left to illustrate a section of his website on the right. The
court found the use was not transformative or for a different purpose, it was
clearly commercial, and the type of use that undermines the licensing market
for stock photography. In a sense, there are parallels with the McGucken
embedding case where an image was used for an illustrative, not a
transformative purpose.

17

Alexander v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 3d 812 (S.D. Ill.

18

Chapman v. Maraj, No. 218CV09088VAPSSX, 2020 WL 6260021 (C.D. Cal. Sept.

2020).
16, 2020).
19

Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2019).
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In the Ninth Circuit, Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. ComicMix20 involved the
book Oh, the Places You'll Boldly Go!—a mash-up of Dr. Seuss books,
including Oh, the Places You'll Go!, and the TV/film franchise, Star Trek. You
can see some comparisons of images from the two works in the decision. The
district court in this case had twice denied motions to dismiss the infringement
claims before granting summary judgment for defendants on their fair use
defense.
Last December, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Just a few takeaways from
this case. On the first factor, Boldly's commercial use of Seussian elements was
not a parody or otherwise transformative. The court concluded that Boldly did
not critique or comment on Go! as a parody would; rather, Boldly mimicked
Go! and paralleled Go!'s purpose. The third factor weighed decisively against
fair use here because Boldly closely replicated “the exact composition, the
particular arrangements of visual components, and the swatches of well-known
illustrations.”
You see some similarities to the fourth factor analysis in the Warhol
case, maybe with different verbiage. The court faulted the district court for
shifting the burden to plaintiffs on market harm and further observed that Boldly
would likely curtail Go!'s existing and potential market for derivative works.
Finally, Warhol v. Goldsmith.21 Just a few weeks ago, the Second Circuit
reversed a finding of fair use in a case involving a photograph used to create an
artwork series.
Some background, in 1984, the photo of Prince was licensed to the
magazine, Vanity Fair, for use as an artist reference for an illustration. Andy
Warhol received the Vanity Fair commission to make an illustration, which he
did, and you can see the magazine illustration. Warhol also made a series of 15
other works, and there are a few examples of those, based on the photo without
the knowledge or consent of the photographer. Since Warhol's death, the
plaintiff not-for-profit foundation has controlled and licensed Warhol's works
including images of the Prince series to Vanity Fair for use in their tribute
edition after Prince's death, which is how Goldsmith finally became aware of
the other Warhol works. There's lots to say about the decision, I'm sure the panel
will have plenty to say, but just a few high-level points I'll conclude on.
The Second Circuit's focus on transformativeness from their previous
opinion in Cariou v. Prince22 was limited, I think, by this decision. One thing
they said about that was that there was no bright-line rule that any secondary
work that adds a new aesthetic or a new expression to its source material is
necessarily transformative. A thing to keep in mind, at least from the Second
Circuit's point of view, is that derivative works can also transform the original
work and that some transformative uses are not fair. They advised, when
evaluating the extent to which a work is transformative fair use versus a
derivative infringement, to consider the purpose of the primary and secondary
works.
I think recognizing that this is challenging in the visual-arts context, they
further refined that a bit by saying that the secondary work “must reasonably be
perceived as embodying an entirely artistic purpose, one that conveys a ‘new
20
21

Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, 983 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2020).
Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 992 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.
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Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
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meaning or message’ entirely separate from its source material.”23 Although the
primary work need not be “barely recognizable,” the “secondary work's
transformative purpose and character must, at a bare minimum, comprise
something more than the imposition of another artist's style on the primary
work.” 24 One note about market harm: as in the Seuss case, the court here
faulted the district court for shifting the burden to Goldsmith and also noted that
substantial potential harm to the derivative market existed. With that, I'll turn it
over to David and the panel to maybe dig a little bit deeper into some of these
decisions I’ve gone through.
DAVID CARSON: Let's start with the embedding case as you talked
about. You talk about how when you embed a photograph, there are cases when
it can be a fair use. But how about a different scenario, which we're often seeing
come up, where a celebrity will take a picture that was taken of him or her by
paparazzi and then post the picture on social media. Do you see a viable fairuse defense in those cases?
NICK BARTELT: Yes. I've been watching a few of those cases. I think
a lot of us probably have seen the cases involving Gigi Hadid and Emily
Ratajkowski. Some of them are more Instagram-friendly stars, but I think also
LeBron James has run into these issues. A lot of them have settled out, so we
haven't gotten through a decision. I think one was dismissed for failing to meet
the registration requirements. Of course, I think if they do something obviously
very transformative with it, that's not just merely reposting, then that's probably
a different matter altogether and the courts are going to look favorably on that.
But it will be interesting to see how courts consider the market for these works
and how this type of use really impacts it, and whether a celebrity using an
image of him or herself really undermines the licensing market for the work.
And even how courts define the market—we'll get into Google v. Oracle—but
I think there's a more potentially a more expansive view of what markets can be
considered and the perspectives that can be offered coming out of that case.
I could see a court looking at this somewhat equitably and saying, "Well,
maybe there's a right of publicity claim here, too,” which is working in the
shadows. “How much is this really affecting their market?” Also, “how much
is a celebrity's reposting of this photo potentially helping the market for it?”
Another case I didn't mention where this factor was, I wouldn't say decisive, but
something that certainly the court considered, involved a Dr. Bell who has a
book called Winning Isn't Normal.25 High school coaches reposted an excerpt
of his philosophy.26 But Dr. Bell makes a lot of his living by going around and
doing speaking engagements rather than by selling copies of this book. Some of
the courts that looked at this thought, “well, to the extent that people are reusing
this book or portions of it, they may be helping his personal brand, that there's
something valuable about that.” I don't know that the same argument can
necessarily be made for a photographer that doesn't receive attribution in
reposting a photo. I guess, depending on the facts, we'll see how some of those
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play out because inevitably, I think these cases are going to come up again and
again. I don't know if anyone else on the panel has thoughts about it.
DAVID CARSON: Does anyone want to pitch in on that? Well, then,
let's move on to one that I thought was very interesting. The Minaj case, that's
a case where we had at least two acts of infringement with respect to one work.
One was the reproduction or the creation of the derivative work. The other was,
I'll use the international term rather than the U.S. term, the making available of
that work through a leak onto, I think it was a radio station -- was it?
NICK BARTELT: That's right.
DAVID CARSON: But that couldn't be traced to Minaj. At least, there
wasn't sufficient evidence there to pin that one on her and she denied that she
had anything to do with it. It sounds like she got two clear prima facie acts of
infringement, but on the one that could be pinned on Minaj, the court found it
was a fair use. I've never seen a case quite like that before.
NICK BARTELT: Same here. That was unique.
DAVID CARSON: Yet, when I read the case, I thought, yes, that makes
a lot of sense. You don't want to stop people from experimenting with stuff even
though it might be technically an act of infringement. But as long as she didn't
make it public, should that be a problem? I'm curious to get other people reacting
to that.
JONATHAN BAND: Well, my sense is, no, it shouldn't be a problem.
It's almost like an intermediate copy in Sega v. Accolade,27 or it's a private copy.
It's the copying, frankly, all of us do all the time, even people on this panel. You
make a lot of copies, especially if you're creating something, it's inevitable. If
all those private copies that never saw the light of day are considered
infringements, then we'd all be in trouble.
DAVID CARSON: Does anyone have a different view on that?
NICK BARTELT: No, I'll just add, I think here too is the market harm
obviously was a big consideration. It did ultimately leak. But I think if you're
making in the privacy of your home or the studio and it doesn't get out, then
what potential harm is there to Chapman from it? Ultimately, there was harm or
she felt there was harm from the distribution. If it had not leaked, then I agree
that it would be odd to penalize individuals for that private behavior.
DAVID CARSON: Of course, if it had not leaked, she wouldn't have
known about it and there wouldn't have been a lawsuit. Well, I hope we'll have
time to get into some of these other cases in the general discussion period. Our
time is up on this now. Let's now move on to the big fair use case, the case of
the century. I guess one question, hopefully, Steve will answer is: did it turn out
to be the copyright case of the century? Steve will now walk us through Google
v. Oracle.
STEVEN TEPP: Thank you, David. My thanks also to Hugh and the
entire conference team, and of course to Fordham University for once again
holding the leading international IP conference in the world and for affording
me the opportunity to speak. The good news is that the decision came Monday
and not this morning. I did have a little time to change my notes, and it makes
this panel really interesting. The bad news is pretty much everything else about
the decision.

27

Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
12

Session 3C
For those who may not be familiar with the case, the dispute arose from
Google's copying of 11,500 lines of Oracle's code in order to build the Google
Android platform and use the attributes of Oracle's code to attract app designers
and thereby catch up to the app offerings of the Apple iPhone. The code Google
copied is known as declaring code and its purpose is to invoke the functions of
various implementing code to produce the desired outputs of the program.
The two issues before the court were whether the declaring code Google
copied is copyrightable, and if so, whether Google's copying qualifies under the
fair use defense. The moment we saw that Justice Breyer had written the opinion
of the court, we knew where it was going to go. After all, he wrote in opposition
to copyright protection for computer code decades ago prior to his judicial
career. His questions at oral argument in this case were openly hostile to
Oracle's position.
We see while it's good to have the Justice Department and the Copyright
Office agree with you on the merits as Oracle did, it's even better to have a
sitting Supreme Court Justice who is determined to see your side win. Justice
Breyer attracted five of his brethren to his opinion, Justice Thomas wrote a
dissent which Justice Alito joined, and Justice Ginsburg's successor, Justice
Barrett, did not participate in the case.
As anyone who's practiced U.S. copyright law knows, first, there must
be a finding of a prima facie case of infringement, which by definition includes
a finding that the work at issue was copyrightable. Then there may be
consideration of the affirmative defense of fair use. If the court had simply held
the code was uncopyrightable, reasonable people would disagree on those
merits, but it would have been an analysis that took place within the analytical
framework of the Copyright Act.
The court had denied cert. on the copyrightability issue earlier in the
long history of this litigation, and the oral argument showed that Google really
had no chance on that issue. My assumption is that Justice Breyer couldn't get
the votes for what he really wanted. Alternatively, the court could have
conducted a copyrightability analysis, found the code copyrightable, and
proceeded with a fair use analysis.
But Justice Breyer was apparently unwilling to give Oracle even that,
perhaps still clinging to his personal policy preferences, even in the face of
congressional enactments to the contrary. The result is an opinion that purports
to assume copyrightability and then undermines that assumption creating an
untenable internal contradiction.
Indeed, the very first sentence of Justice Breyer's consideration of the
four fair use factors, characterizes the code as "user interface." This
characterizes the code as user interface. This is the drop-the-mic moment in the
decision. Because instead of remaining faithful to an assumption of
copyrightability of the creative code, Justice Breyer immediately adopts the
function-focused language of Google's argument that the code is not
protectable.
Thus, Justice Breyer concludes, "The declaring code is, if copyrightable
at all, further than are most computer programs from the core of copyright." 28
This is an explicit contradiction with a supposed assumption of copyrightability.
If there was a true assumption of copyrightability, the second-factor, nature of
28
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the copyrighted work, would have to favor Oracle. But Justice Breyer concluded
exactly the opposite.
The first factor and transformative use analysis simply adopts Google's
view of the case, quoting extensively from Google and its amici's briefing. It
brushes aside the fact that Google used the copied code for exactly the same
purpose for which it was written, ignores that Google rejected a license because
it did not want to abide by interoperability requirements, and reaches a
conclusion of transformativeness because Google put it in a different box, a
smartphone, without ever acknowledging that Oracle presented evidence the
code had already been licensed in another mobile device.
The third-factor, amount and substantiality of the portion copied, the
Court acknowledges that the declaring code was the needed "key" that Google
copied to give itself a commercial advantage "to improve its own innovative
Android systems." That is seemingly a strong basis for finding that Google
copied the heart of the work. Perversely, Justice Breyer considers that to support
a finding a fair use.
For the fourth factor, harm to the market or potential market for the
work, the Court contradicts itself. It first suggested that the original authors of
the code would have not been successful migrating to smart mobile devices. It
then acknowledged that enforcement of copyright "could well prove highly
profitable to Oracle," which sounds a lot like market harm if the copyright is
not enforced. Having found that harm to a potential market, Justice Breyer
disregards it on the basis that enforcing copyright would "harm the public." This
is only one of many examples of the derogatory language Justice Breyer uses to
describe copyright. This opinion is littered with epithets mischaracterizing
copyright as a tax, a monopoly, etc. Of course, this is all dicta. While internet
trolls will make copious use of it, in fact it further undermines the credibility of
the opinion. The Court does all this with virtually no attempt to apply the actual
definition of computer program in the statute as Justice Thomas' clear-headed
dissent points out. Nor does Justice Breyer grapple with arguments presented
by Oracle, the Justice Department and the Copyright Office, or supportive
amici.
Finally, Justice Breyer made it clear that he knew exactly what he was
doing all along. He wrote that fair use can provide "a context-based check that
can help to keep a copyright monopoly within its lawful bounds." 29 This is a
tacit admission that despite the façade of claiming to assume copyrightability,
he undid that in the context of fair use. Even further, this hints at expanding the
role of fair use beyond an affirmative defense to some inherent limitation on
exclusive rights. Such an unprecedented and fundamental shift would be truly
concerning if it weren't for the fact that his fellow justices did put a limit on his
frolic and detour. In its closing lines, the majority opinion reaffirms, "We do not
overturn or modify our earlier cases involving fair use."30 That, along with other
language of the text narrowing the opinion to the facts of the case, indicate that
the precedential value of this opinion is minimal and perhaps zero. This is an
opinion comprised almost entirely of dicta, laboring under its internal
contradictions, burdened with the weight of Justice Breyer's polemic musings,
and leads to only one single clear holding: Google wins.
29
30
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DAVID CARSON: Thank you Steve. You knew this question was
coming. Did this turn out to be the copyright case of the century?
STEVEN TEPP: Well, it's the copyright case of the century for Oracle
because they have an entire line of business that may have just been required to
subsidize Google. But with an opinion that has virtually no precedential value,
it's hard to call it the case of the century.
DAVID CARSON: In fact, some of the commentary following the
Court's ruling suggests that this case was rather sui generis and it's not likely to
have a lot of influence and other fair use cases, at least when they involve works
other than computer programs and perhaps not even when they involve
implementing code. I’m wondering what your reaction to that is and I'd like to
hear if others on the panel have a different reaction.
STEVEN TEPP: Sui generis, I think is another way of saying what I just
said that instead of following a proper copyrightability analysis and then a fair
use affirmative defense analysis, the Court tried to pretend it was assuming
copyrightability and then undo that in the context of fair use. You can't actually
reach fair use if you don't have the copyrightable work in the first place.
Doctrinally, it doesn't make any sense. You could call it sui generis, or I heard
one commentator describe it as an advisory opinion that here are Justice Breyer's
thoughts about Oracle's declaring code and copyright.
DAVID CARSON: I'm not sure I heard an answer to the question
whether you think it's going to have influence on future fair use cases though?
STEVEN TEPP: I thought I did, but no. I think this case has almost zero
precedential value anywhere including software and even including declaring
code.
DAVID CARSON: Jonathan, I suspect you've got a different
perspective. Would you like to share?
JONATHAN BAND: Sure. Just a slightly different perspective. At the
highest level, I do agree with Steve that it's frustrating that they assumed the
protectability of the declaring code. Again, just to make all the terminology very
clear, there's no question that the overall Java API, the 15 million lines of code,
overall was clearly copyrightable. At issue was whether the 11,000 lines used
by Google were protectable, meaning whether those lines on their own are on
the idea side or the expression side of the idea-expression dichotomy.
The work as a whole, clearly, was protectable. It was just about the
protectability of these individual set of lines. I agree with Steve it's odd that they
jumped over that, and I just assume that was because they couldn't reach five
votes in favor of that. They decided that rather than have one of these fractured
decisions that's so hard for everyone to parse, they would just assume that and
go on to fair use.
It could be there are some other contradictions, and I agree that there's
some other inconsistencies. But to say that this is all Justice Breyer's policy
preferences does really minimize the other five justices who joined him. None
of them are shrinking violets. They obviously agreed, and it could be that a lot
of what was said and how it was said reflects what they want, whether it's their
policy preferences or copyright judgements.
In terms of the impact, I agree with Steve—aside from the issue about
the standard of review of the jury decision in fair use cases, and I think that that
will have obviously impact across the board and I'd be interested to hear what
others say about if there is any point in having a jury in a case that really focuses
15
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on fair use going forward—I think it will have a very limited impact outside of
the software space and even outside the issue of interfaces.
The protectability of interfaces is a hugely important issue. It's narrow.
It might not affect most of the people in the room who are dealing with films
and sound recordings and other literary works, books and so forth. But if we're
talking about dollar value, the dollar value about this issue of protectability of
interfaces, this is maybe not a trillion-dollar issue, but it's a hundreds and
hundreds of billion dollars issue. It's the rules of competition for software. Given
that software is in everything, that means it really affects the way people will be
able to compete in virtually every part of the economy. Yes, very narrow but of
enormous significance. It really does ensure that copyright doesn't become a
pseudo-patent law and allow people to, without getting a patent, be able to
exercise patent-like control.
DAVID CARSON: I definitely want to get to the standard of review
issue, which is an interesting one. Before we do that, I want to see whether
anyone else does want to take issue with what we've heard so far or add their
voices to it.
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: I would like to say something if you can hear
me.
DAVID CARSON: Yes, we can.
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: Great. I appreciate the comments that Steve
made, but I don't think it's possible to say that a Supreme Court opinion as
significant as this one will not affect decisions in areas other than computer
software. The approach of the Supreme Court in this case ignored the market
effect on licensing, which the Second Circuit in the Warhol decision
emphasized and other courts have emphasized. I think if the lower courts are
going to be affected by anything in this opinion, it's going to be putting less
weight on the fourth factor.
I also think that the fact that the Court elevated factor two, the nature of
the use, to its first topic of inquiry may change the approach of some lower
courts because everybody in prior fair use decisions the courts had generally
minimized the significance of this factor. The fact that it matters so much in
Google, is going to be significant going forward, most certainly in computer
software cases and possibly in others. I also must say that I found Justice
Thomas's dissent to be pretty much on point because to avoid the
copyrightability issue – I agree with Steve on this – really is avoiding the hard
distinctions in the case. In the past, when the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to rule on this going back to Lotus v. Borland,31 there was a 4-4 affirmance
which basically left the First Circuit opinion in place (unfortunately, one justice
had to recuse himself). The First Circuit opinion in Lotus, which was cited in
the majority opinion in Google, held that the Lotus 1-2-3 software was
copyrightable and, infringed. There's a lot more to say, but I'll stop here.
DAVID CARSON: A lot of interesting points in there. Our time is up
but now we move into a general discussion. We will come back to the Google
case I'm sure. Kevin, let's now move onto the legislative front and talk about the
PLSA and the CASE Act.
KEVIN MADIGAN: All right. Thanks, David, and thank you everyone
at Fordham. I'm going to be talking about two copyright-related bills that were
31
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd, 516 U.S.
233 (1996).
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signed into law late last year. I'm going to move quite quickly because there's a
lot to get through.
The CASE Act is the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims
Enforcement Act. It was signed into law in December 2020 but it won't be
implemented entirely until December 2021 at the earliest. That's because it
establishes a small-claims tribunal in the U.S. Copyright Office to provide a
streamlined and affordable alternative to bringing claims in federal court. The
tribunal will be called the Copyright Claims Board (CCB). One of the key
components is that it's voluntary with an opt-out provision. It's simplified and
streamlined. With no travel required, parties can appear virtually. Attorneys are
not required and also statutory damages are limited to $15,000 per claim
compared to 10 times that in federal court. And there is no more than $30,000
total damages compared to no limit in federal court. The types of claims that
can be brought are copyright infringement claims, declarations of noninfringement, and also DMCA 512 misrepresentation claims related to
knowingly sending false notices or counter-notices.
A little bit more about the CCB: it's going to be made up of three officers
who will act as judges. They will evaluate and adjudicate copyright
infringement claims. Importantly, these officers will be selected by the
Librarian of Congress. They will be supported by two attorneys and an admin
team that will assist the officers.
A little bit about how the CCB will look in practice: after a claim is
discovered and maybe parties fail to resolve an issue, a claimant can file a claim
at the Copyright Claims Board. After the claim is filed, the CCB attorneys will
examine the claims to make sure they meet the CASE Act requirement. If it
does, the claimant then serves notice upon the respondent consistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Then the respondent will have 60 days to
decide whether to opt-out or participate in the proceeding. If they chose to opt
out, the case is immediately terminated. If they don't opt-out, the CCB will issue
a scheduling order including dates for the respondent to file counterclaims and
defenses. Then when the proceeding takes place the CCB will supervise
discovery, conduct conferences, and facilitate settlement negotiations. After the
CCB renders their decision, the parties will have 30 days to request
reconsideration by the CCB and then another 30 days after that to request review
by the Register of Copyrights. After reconsideration and review, the losing party
will have a limited right to appeal the decision to federal district court.
There are some safeguards in place to ensure the CCB is constitutional
and doesn't become inundated with meritless claims. Those are that, as I
mentioned earlier, it's voluntary, there's the opt-out provision. The notice
requirements mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are penalties
for bad faith claims or actors. Basically, the CCB can ban recidivist bad-faith
claimants. The CCB can dismiss a claim for being unsuitable, including claims
brought for harassment or other improper purposes. Finally, the Copyright
Office can limit the number of claims that can be brought within a given year.
Moving onto the Protecting Lawful Streaming Act (PLSA) because I
know I’m already probably almost out of time. Protecting Lawful Streaming
Act or the PLSA became law at the same time in December 2020. But unlike
the CASE Act, it became effective immediately. The law is aimed at closing
something called the streaming loophole which had allowed those who violate
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the public performance rights implicated by streaming to only be subject to
misdemeanor penalties.
Before the passage of the PLSA, criminal penalties for copyright
infringement distinguished between offering a work for downloading and
offering a work for streaming. That's because criminal copyright law was based
on the reproduction and distribution rights that were implicated by earlier forms
of infringement. As we all know now, streaming is the dominant form of content
consumption online and it implicates the public performance right. In early
2020, Senator Thom Tillis brought together representatives from diverse tech
and content industries as well as user communities to negotiate an update to the
law that would hold accountable large-scale commercial piracy operations
while at the same time not sweeping up end-users or legitimate businesses.
The agreement that was reached was an update to the law that would add
a new Section 2319(c) to Title 18 of criminal infringement of copyright. The
framework of the new 2319 Section was inspired in part by Section 1201
anticircumvention provisions. That was chosen as a model because of the way
that it targets technologies and devices that are specifically designed for
circumvention or infringement and that have no other significant commercial
purpose.
What the law really wants to go after is the really bad actors. The new
law makes it a prohibited act for any person who willfully and for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain offers and provides to the public
a digital transmission service that—three prongs—is designed or provided for
the purpose of public performing works protected under Title 17 that would be
subject to the penalty under the new law. The next prong says that the service
is liable if it has no commercial significant purpose or use other than to publicly
perform protected works under Title 17. Then finally the last prong, a service is
liable if it's intentionally marketed to promote its use in unauthorized streaming.
What kind of penalties are we talking about? The base offense penalty
is a fine or imprisonment of not more than three years, or both. The next step
up from there is a fine or an imprisonment of no more than five years, or both.
This is enhanced for pre-released and live-streaming content. Talking about
things like movies that are not yet released or they're still in the theater and also
pay-per-view sporting events like boxing or UFC 32 fights where piracy can be
very hard to combat and it completely destroys the market for the work because
it loses all value basically as soon as the event is over. Then the highest penalty
is for second or subsequent offenses. It's a fine and not more than 10 years
imprisonment. It's important to understand that these penalties are the same,
those that have existed for years for the violations of reproduction and
distribution rights.
DAVID CARSON: Kevin, I think your time's up. Do you have any last
point you want to make before we get into some discussion?
KEVIN MADIGAN: I was just going to go through a couple of the
things that wouldn't be swept up under the bill. Those are normalized practices,
good-faith business disputes, non-commercial activities, and users engaged in
ordinary activities, but that's it.
DAVID CARSON: Great. Now, the Protecting Lawful Streaming Act
took a different form than the kind of legislation on that topic that we've seen
32
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proposed over the last several Congresses. Can you tell us a little bit about why
there was that change in approach?
KEVIN MADIGAN: The bills that would have addressed illegal
streaming in the past took a bit of a broader view of the activities that should be
subject to felony penalties. There was fear among user communities and tech
communities that the grandmothers or the Justin Biebers of the world would be
jailed for posting a video with infringing content or streaming a video at home.
What the PLSA does is it takes a much more narrowly tailored approach by only
subjecting these large-scale commercial piracy services to the heightened
penalties. It has to be someone that's offering an actual service. That was also
the result of months of negotiations. In the end, while I think the content
community probably wanted something a little less narrow, they understood that
this was a big step towards at least deterring some of the most egregious forms
of streaming piracy.
DAVID CARSON: Jonathan, I understand you were part of a disparate
group of stakeholder representatives who about a year ago got together and tried
to work out something that ended up being this legislation. Can you tell us a
little bit about that process and why? I'm making the assumption here that you
moved from opposition to at least benign neutrality with respect to the new
version of the bill.
JONATHAN BAND: Yes, that's right and I think Kevin described the
concerns and also accurately described the narrow, more-tailored approach
addressed to those concerns. In effect, the problem was, and one can say this
about all the criminal provisions certainly to the extent you're dealing with
public performances over the internet, is that almost anyone could meet the
criminal thresholds pretty easily, so everything is left to prosecutorial discretion.
Maybe in an older time, a more pleasant time, we would say, "That's
fine. We always trust the prosecutors. The Justice Department would never be
politicized." But certainly, after the past four years, I think there's a greater
recognition, "We can't rely too much just on prosecutorial discretion." You can't
just assume that prosecutors are just going to always act in the interest of justice.
That's why we're much more comfortable with this narrower approach.
DAVID CARSON: I for one think it's great that you came to the defense
of Justin Bieber. I'm sure he appreciates it as well. Let's move on to the CASE
Act. Kevin, we know that for constitutional reasons, Congress had to structure
the CASE Act to give everyone who was a defendant, or respondent as the
CASE Act calls it, the ability to opt-out of a proceeding. But isn't that the
Achilles’ heel of the act? At the end of the day, how many cases do you think
the copyright claims board is actually going to be able to adjudicate, when if
you're a defendant, one would imagine the natural thing to do would be to say,
"Why shouldn't I opt-out? Chances are the plaintiff's not going to be able to
afford to take me to federal court, so I'll just sit back and thumb my nose at
him."
KEVIN MADIGAN: Yes, I think that's a legitimate concern. I don't
know if I'd call it the Achilles Heel. There's certainly a concern that a lot of
people will opt-out, especially in the first year or the first months that the CCB
is up and running. But I think there will be some cases where a claimant will be
able to then take their claims to federal court. They may be few and far between,
but if an infringer gets hit with a big damages penalty in federal court after
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opting out of the CCB then maybe respondents will think more about whether
they actually want to opt out.
I would also say that at the very least, even if every single respondent
opts out, there's educational value or a teaching-moment value in a respondent
maybe recognizing that they may have done something that constitutes
infringement. Maybe after they get the notice and opt-out, they actually maybe
go to the Copyright Office website or read about copyright and fair use there
and they learn and maybe they're a little bit more careful in the future if they're
making use of copyrighted work. There is some good that can come, even if
many opt out in the beginning.
DAVID CARSON: Have you given any thought to what the Copyright
Office might do to make this a more attractive option for people who find
themselves on the wrong act of a case act claim?
KEVIN MADIGAN: I think there's limited information that the
Copyright Office is going to be able to include in the notice sent to the
respondent, other than, "Here are some of your potential defenses." I'm not sure
that that notice is really going to get into what the dangers are if they don't opt
out, because there might be some constitutional concerns there if they're found
to be pressuring people into participating in it. On behalf of the Copyright
Office, I don't know how much they can do. But they have just released all the
NOI33 on all the regulations that they're going to be issuing over the next few
months. There might be questions like this coming up, and there'll be
opportunity for the public to weigh in on some of that.
DAVID CARSON: Jonathan, I gather you're not a fan of the CASE Act.
If I'm wrong, please correct me. If I'm right about that, can you explain why?
JONATHAN BAND: No, you're not wrong. The main concern is that it
could become a venue where copyright trolls will be able to pursue folks and
that the people who know better will opt out, as you suggest, and that in the end
the people who don't know better will be stuck in this tribunal. That's why we've
always thought that it would be a better approach to have to make it opt in, so
that if people wanted to affirmatively opt in, that's fine. If they don't want to opt
in, if they just don't know better and don't know that they're better off in federal
court and that they don't end up before this tribunal by failing to opt out. There's
a zillion studies that show the enormous difference between opting in and opting
out and that how people, especially when don't really understand what's going
on, are much more likely to fail to opt out. That would be the concern with this
opt-out structure. You're going to end up with a lot of people who just don't
know better in that tribunal.
DAVID CARSON: Steve, do you have something to say?
STEVEN TEPP: Yes. Thanks, David. Your question about the opt-out
system, we've just seen the irony here. On one hand, it can be used by people
who are infringers and just want to make it tougher for the copyright owner to
enforce their rights. On the other hand, the people who oppose the CASE Act
no matter how many changes were made, still say, "Oh, it's going to be ripe with
abuse and trolls."
This notion of copyright trolls is one of the favorite bugaboos of the
copyright-skeptic crowd. Of course, what's not clear when they're saying this is
that there is no definition of what that is, but when I hear people talk about it, it
33
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very often ends up being legitimate copyright owners who actually are pursuing
actual infringements. To the extent that there are lawyers out there engaging in
abusive litigation practices that violate federal rules, they've been sanctioned,
and that's appropriate, and that's what the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
for.
My view of the CASE Act is this, it's got so many safeguards against
abuse: limitations on damages, the opt-out provision, and limitations on the
number of cases a single complainant can bring. It is virtually impossible to
imagine it would genuinely be a preferred option for abuse. It's also true that
sophisticated infringers who are willing to gamble going to federal court may
opt out. Of course, they are taking a gamble, because if the copyrighter decides
to pursue the case in federal court, it's going to cost that defendant a lot more
money to defend their case, just as it will cost the copyright owner a lot more
money to pursue it. My view, in the end, is that the CASE Act provides a very
good forum for genuine good-faith disputes. You're a copyright owner, you
genuinely think I have infringed your rights, I genuinely think I didn't, and we're
both looking for a simple way to resolve that. We can't reach an agreement on
settlement, so we're going to go to the Copyright Claims Board and settle it there
in a relatively efficient manner.
DAVID CARSON: Bob, you're a lawyer in private practice, you've
represented plaintiffs and defendants. What role do you see for private
practitioners in this system? Is it one where you really can't see much of a role
for people who are necessarily going to have to charge their clients fees to
represent them?
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: I really don't. I would prefer, if I could, to make
a comment on a subject that has not yet been addressed, perhaps because it is
often ignored in fair use decisions. That is whether the withholding of injunctive
relief could reduce the tension between (a) the public interest in promoting the
progress of the arts by protecting the exclusive rights of copyright owners, and
(b) the public interest in the fair use of pre-existing works in the creation of new
ones. If you go back to Harper & Row,34 the Supreme Court, in dicta, observed
that not every case is worthy of an injunction. Judge Leval commented in a
Copyright Society Brace Lecture in 1989 that if an injunction had been sought
in that case, the fair use analysis might have been different. 35
In eBay v MercExchange, 36 the Supreme Court held that four factors
must be considered before granting injunctive relief. One of those factors – the
public interest – would weigh against granting injunctive relief when the
defendant’s work, even if infringing, nevertheless provides significant cultural
benefits. In that event, the plaintiff could still recover damages. Such an
approach would encourage the courts to have more flexibility in balancing the
diverse interests impacted by their copyright decisions.
DAVID CARSON: You obviously attended the Brace Lecture by my
former partner Richard Dannay several years ago, and he articulated pretty
much the same thought.
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: I have a copy in front of me.
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Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul?, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 167 [the 1989 Donald
C. Brace Memorial Lecture].
36
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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DAVID CARSON: [laughs] Does anyone else have any views on that?
Maybe to rephrase it a bit, a lot of fair use cases are tough calls. It could go one
way or the other. Some cases are maybe what you might call marginal fair use
cases. There's one way to deal with that – to say, "Fine, we're not going to say
it's fair use, but we're also not going to issue an injunction. You can pay the
copyright owner what the copyright owner is due, but you can continue to do
it." Is that a way of dealing with those kinds of cases?
JONATHAN BAND: Yes, I agree. I think that's an appropriate solution,
particularly for example in the Warhol v. Goldsmith case that we heard earlier.
Even though I'm obviously pretty aggressively pro-fair use, I think that was an
easy case. I think it was correctly decided especially because the photograph
was created for precisely the purpose as a reference work for Andy Warhol's
use and then he made 15 more pictures than he was allowed to. That was not
remotely fair. At the same time, they're Warhols. You don't want to have an
injunction, you want to make sure that they're publicly available. The fair use
defense should fail, but it should be publicly available. No injunctive relief and
the royalties and damages should be assessed. The part of it is to make sure that
the damages are really reasonable. There was a license fee paid for one. He
made 15, so 15 times the license fee adjusted for inflation would be a perfectly
appropriate royalty in this case and that should resolve it.
DAVID CARSON: Does anyone think that's a terrible idea?
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: I'll tell you another reason why it's a good idea.
In the front page of the Arts Section of the New York Times this week, a
distinguished art critic talked about appropriation art, such as Andy Warhol's
art, as benefiting society and the art world. If copyright does not recognize
appropriation art as something that would not be infringing, then I think that in
that case the lack of an injunction could be a public benefit.
DAVID CARSON: There's so much more we would have loved to talk
about. I'm very sorry we weren't able to do it. It's a fascinating discussion.
Hopefully, we can continue in some other forum.
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